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POSSIBILITIES FOR ADVANCING NEW PROPOSALS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY IN  
CONNECTION WITH GERMAN REUNIFICATION

SUMMARY

The underlying paper reviews various possibilities for advancing new proposals on European security in conjunction with the reunification of Germany.

After summarizing United States objectives in this field (p. 1) the paper discusses three major lines of approach.

Parts II A and B (pp 2-5) consider the possibility of total or partial troop withdrawals from Germany -- a proposition which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered at least theoretically possible if compensatory measures are taken. This section also points out briefly how the political advantages which might result therefrom would permit greater flexibility in proposing formulae for reunification.

Part II C (pp 5-10) deals with the possibilities for linking European security measures more closely to disarmament. Such an approach might make it easier to focus attention on the need to link reductions of western military capabilities with corresponding limitations on the capabilities and striking power of Soviet armed forces.

Part II D (pp 10-12) discusses the possibility of reformulating assurances offered at Geneva against German aggression. While noting the Soviet disclaimer of any interest in such a guarantee the section suggests some reformulations which might meet criticisms of the Geneva assurance current in the West.

Attachment A summarizes briefly the British-French-German-United States discussions since Geneva on German reunification and European security.

Attachment B examines in some detail the political implications of proposals in the European security field and endeavors to point up the inter-relationships between European security and German reunification.

Attachment C presents the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on European security and German reunification as formulated in March 1958 together with the views of the Department of Defense on the same subject.

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POSSIBILITIES FOR ADVANCING NEW PROPOSALS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY IN  
CONNECTION WITH GERMAN REUNIFICATION

I. Objectives.

A. Long-range objectives.

1. To bring about a situation -- preferably through negotiation -- which will lessen the danger of war in Europe, provide adequately for our national security as well as the freedom and self-reliance of our European allies and contribute to a reduction of the burden of armaments.
2. To remove a major cause of instability in Europe -- the division of Germany -- but without writing off the possibility of free determination for the countries of Eastern Europe. This is an essential factor in achieving the first objective.

B. Intermediate objectives.

1. To keep world opinion convinced we are doing our utmost to achieve objective A1.
2. To keep German opinion convinced we are doing our utmost to achieve objective A2. This is an essential factor in holding Germany as a devoted ally.

C. Special objective relating to the Berlin situation.

1. To furnish the Soviet Union an opportunity to engage in prolonged discussions -- comparable in this respect to the Palais Rose or Austrian Peace Treaty negotiations -- to give them an excuse for not taking drastic actions in Berlin.

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## II. Possible Changes in U.S. Policy on European Security and German Reunification

In the last two years British, French, United States and German representatives have frequently discussed the problem of how to make the Geneva proposals more appealing by introducing changes in substance or presentation. These discussions have revealed a paucity of new ideas acceptable to all four countries. Even more discouraging, they have disclosed less unanimity of view than existed in 1955 at Geneva. A brief summary of these discussions is attached at TAB A.

In the following sections of this paper various possibilities for new approaches to these problems are discussed. In the first two sections possibilities for troop withdrawals, which were not explored in any detail in the course of the Geneva discussions, are considered. The following sections deal more fully with possible modifications of Geneva formulae. For a more general discussion of political problems involved in disengagement proposals, see TAB D.

### A. Total Troop Withdrawals

1. In 1958 the Joint Chiefs of Staff held that it was possible to contemplate the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Germany as part of an agreement on reunification.

### 2. Discussion

In considering possible proposals which might be made in the field of European security in conjunction with German reunification the Joint Chiefs of Staff last March reached the following conclusions:

"a. The US can accept, as the price of a reunified Germany, in or out of NATO, the withdrawal of all foreign forces from a United Germany provided:

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"1. Allied forces in Germany can be relocated in areas contiguous to Germany.

"2. USSR forces from Germany will be positioned behind Soviet borders.

"3. A compensatory buildup is permitted a United Germany.

"4. Adequate safeguards are agreed to in order to verify the withdrawals and prevent evasion.

"b. Withdrawals or disengagements of military forces from a divided Germany or the establishment of atom-free zones in Central Europe pose unacceptable military risks."


In forwarding these views to the State Department the Department of Defense stated its opinion that "the relocation of any substantial number of United States forces in areas contiguous to Germany, such as France or the Lowlands, would be attended by obstacles - political and financial as well as military - of an order as to render such relocation a highly doubtful alternative to the withdrawal of these forces from the Continent. In any event this would seem to accentuate the necessity of assuring a united Germany the right to raise and maintain forces adequate for her defense requirements."

The withdrawal of Soviet troops under effective guarantees to prevent their return would have profound political consequences and would make it possible to consider arrangements in connection with reunification -- for example arrangements about confederation -- which would be unacceptable if a Communist East German Government supported by Soviet troops remained in power. Without Soviet ground troops it would probably be impossible for the Communist puppet government to remain in power. The East German population is overwhelmingly anti-Russian and the withdrawal of Soviet troops would release political forces in East Germany which would probably sweep away the Grotewohl government and produce a situation in which a new government or constituent assembly might take events into its own hands and move to reunite with the Federal Government by direct action.

3. Possibility of Development

In view of the JCS views cited above a policy decision should be made whether we should discuss with our allies the advisability of making a definite offer to the Soviet Union regarding troop withdrawals along the lines found acceptable to the JCS (after a review of the problem in the light of current circumstances) and

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ascertain from our allies whether it would be possible to relocate a sufficient number of our troops in other European areas to provide adequately for the defense of Europe.

B. Partial Troop Withdrawals

1. The Soviets have frequently proposed partial troop withdrawals from Germany in connection based on the status quo in Europe. Is there any possibility that this offer could be turned to our advantage in connection with reunification?

2. Discussion

Since 1956 the Soviet Union has proposed in various forums the withdrawal of one-third of the foreign troops in Germany. These proposals have usually been linked with other more sweeping proposals in the fields of disarmament or European security and have always been predicated on the maintenance of the political status quo in Europe - either on the continued division of Germany or a confederal settlement of the German problem which would clearly be to the disadvantage of the United States. The most recent suggestion of this sort was made by Mikoyan on January 5. He said: "The Soviet Union regarded as a very important point the question as to what was to be done with the foreign troops in Germany after the peace treaty. It favored withdrawal in a short time. If it were not being realistic about the matter and the United States were not prepared for this, it was the Soviet desire to reach a common policy and it would be prepared to seek alternative solutions. One of these might be to have one-third of the foreign troops withdrawn within six months after the conclusion of a peace treaty and to leave the question of full withdrawal and the dates concerned for decision in the future."

Mikoyan was probably thinking of a peace treaty signed with the "two Germanies" in view of the context in which he made these particular remarks. Withdrawals based on the status quo would not be acceptable to the Federal German Government or to us. However, there might be some advantage in exploring the possibility of proposing partial troop withdrawals in conjunction with German reunification. In weighing the military feasibility of such an agreement the political disadvantage of permitting the Soviet Union to keep 200,000 or more troops in the eastern portion of a reunified Germany should not be lost sight of.

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3. Possibility of Development

At the time the JCS reviewed the possibility of troop withdrawals in connection with German reunification, they did not consider the possibility of withdrawals of one-third of the foreign troops in Germany specifically. The views of the JCS should be sought on this specific proposal. They should also consider the possibility of withdrawing additional troops at agreed intervals, possibly in step with specific advances in the field of general disarmament.

C. Limitation of Forces and Armaments

1. The Western Powers at Geneva proposed a "zone comprising areas of comparable size and depth and importance on both sides of the line of demarcation between a reunited Germany and the Eastern European countries, in which levels of armed forces would be specified so as to establish a military balance which would contribute to European security and help to relieve the burden of armaments .... In the parts of the zone which lie closest to the line of demarcation, there might be special measures relating to the disposition of military forces and installations."

2. Discussion

In the preliminary planning for the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers the British Government proposed the establishment of a Western restricted zone comprising part or the whole of Germany and possibly Denmark and an Eastern zone comprising part of Poland and Czechoslovakia. In the western and eastern zones there would be two categories of forces: (a) national forces of the country whose territory lies within the zone; and (b) visiting forces (i.e. forces of allied countries stationed in the area). They proposed that separate ceilings be set for each category. Initial ceilings for the second category would be the existing strengths "which might be progressively reduced to bring them into line with figures proposed in the General Disarmament Agreement". WNU limitations would be used for the first category. The British also proposed a demilitarized zone to be established between the eastern and western restricted zones. They suggested an area bounded on the east by the existing boundary between East Germany and Poland and on the west by the line Dismar/River Elbe/River Saale and then parallel to the Czech frontier through Regensburg.

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The German delegation to the Geneva Working Group supported the general idea of a demilitarized zone in East Germany. In September, 1955 they proposed that the Western Powers give an assurance that western forces would not be moved into any area evacuated by eastern forces.

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in connection with these proposals that "they would find militarily acceptable a demilitarized zone encompassing approximately equal territory on both sides of the de facto eastern border of Germany, particularly if such a demilitarized zone extended southward to include the contiguous area in Czechoslovakia. However, a zone confined to East Germany or one falling generally between the Elbe and the Oder-Neisse .... is no longer considered acceptable from the military point of view."

The Four Foreign Ministers agreed in October to accept the generalized language contained in the Geneva proposals and to postpone decisions on more precise proposals until the Soviets indicated an interest in pursuing this subject.

In a press statement on May 15, 1957 Chancellor Adenauer stated that the West Germans "would be ready to refrain from advancing further or to permit the advancing of NATO troops beyond what is now the Iron Curtain". In the Declaration of Berlin, the United States joined in an assurance that "in the event of a reunified Germany choosing to join NATO they would not take military advantage as a result of the withdrawal of Soviet forces."

At the 1958 meetings of the British, French, German and American experts on European security and German reunification the American representative put forward proposals envisaged a European security arrangement involving three zones. An inner zone comprising roughly the present Soviet zone of Germany and a comparable area of Poland and Czechoslovakia would be subject to measures of quasi-demilitarization with only limited indigenous forces permitted. (This provided automatically for the removal of Soviet forces from the East Zone and adjacent Polish areas.) A second zone, comprising the remainder of Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, would be subject to force and arms limits, with limits fixed for total forces without regard to nationality. This would have placed a ceiling on total forces in Western Germany which could either be composed of German forces or mixed German and other NATO forces. The rationale of this proposal was that, for military purposes, only the size and armament of permitted forces was important. At the same time the proposal avoided the difficulty of calling for a withdrawal of United States forces.

Meanwhile, the Germans were constructing their position. When they finally presented it to Adenauer, he rejected any idea of a European security arrangement divorced from disarmament. He questioned the value of limitations confined to a narrow zone in view of the development of modern

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weapons and talked vaguely of an arms control plan running from the Atlantic to the Urals. The Chancellor's position was probably motivated in part by his view that emphasis in any negotiations with the Soviets should be placed on disarmament rather than Germany. His public enunciation of this view had already caused some difficulty in the light of positions taken regarding a Summit meeting.

The United States proposal for an inner zone was objected to by the other powers as asking too much of the Soviets in its eastern extension. (The Germans also withdrew their earlier agreement to the concept of a quasi-demilitarized zone completely.) Neither the Germans nor the French would agree to the area of Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia as the basic area of force and arms limitation. In fact, the Germans were unwilling to accept the idea of a zone. (The preceding four paragraphs were condensed from pages 2 and 3 of attachment A.)

### 3. Possibility of Development

In view of Chancellor Adenauer's emphasis on disarmament in connection with reunification we might formulate our proposals on European security so as to link them more closely with disarmament proposals. This would of course be done without prejudice to our present position that the elements of our first-stage disarmament proposals can be negotiated without being dependant on concurrent progress on reunification. We might propose:

- a. that the European inspection zone agreed to by the Four Western Powers in the London Disarmament negotiations but never offered to the Soviet Union (i.e. the 50°E-35°E zone) be used as a point of departure for zones of inspection, limitation and control to be proposed in connection with German reunification;
- b. that the United States, British, French and Soviet ceilings proposed by the Four Western Powers in 1957 for the second phase of a disarmament agreement be used as the basis for working out a staged withdrawal of visiting forces from the central portion of this 50°E - 35° zone; (Planned withdrawals might be tied in with other aspects

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of disarmament and with progress in reunification. Visiting forces might first be withdrawn from an area corresponding to the central zone proposed by the British in 1955 -- or if military advisers agree an area running slightly further West -- and extended to wider areas in phase with progress in disarmament, especially in the field of inspection and general reduction of force levels including Soviet and U.S. forces. It should be remembered that Adenauer and the French are strongly opposed to the idea of narrow zones. However, the linking of this proposal to reduction of Soviet force levels and to a wider inspection zone might make this proposal more palatable. There seems to be no present likelihood the Soviet Union would accept this proposal but it might serve to give the impression that we were looking for new formulations and that our propositions are reasonable.)

c. that in return for German reunification on acceptable terms atomic weapons would not be stationed in the central area from which visiting troops were withdrawn provided a significant portion of Soviet territory was subject to inspection against surprise attack.

The current impasse on the Surprise Attack Talks in Geneva and widespread feeling that the Soviet Union will not accept inspection of its own territory lay this proposal open to the criticism that by attaching a condition which we know to be unacceptable we are being negative. Nevertheless, this seems to be the minimum which we could offer safely in this field.

All of these proposals would require military assessments, in particular on the following questions: (1) will the development of nuclear weapons, particularly missile developments, result in comprehensive changes

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in the requirements for ground forces in Europe; and (2) would U.S. atomic support commands stationed in Western Europe outside the Federal Republic combined with available European forces, including German forces provide an adequate deterrent to Soviet attack on Europe? For the JCS views on these questions as of March 1958, see TAB B.

D. Inspection and Control

1. The Western Powers at Geneva proposed that the signatories of a Treaty of Assurance on the Reunification of Germany "would provide information on an agreed progressive basis on their armed forces in the zone. There would be progressive procedures of mutual inspection to verify such data and to warn against any preparation for surprise attack."

2. Discussion

In the course of the London Disarmament negotiations the question of a European inspection zone was exhaustively discussed in NATO. The plans for methods of control worked out in the course of this discussion should be utilized in planning for new steps toward reunification. (The fact that the inspection zone envisaged included a sizable portion of European Russia and that both Russia and the United States were to be inspected may also be helpful in the general context of seeking a solution to the German problem. The inspection of a part of European Russia should have a bearing on the deployment of troops in Western Europe, and particularly when considered in connection with the capabilities of new atomic weapons may reduce somewhat the need for depth in NATO dispositions.)

During preliminary British, French, German, U.S. talks on German reunification and European security, the Americans suggested an inspection zone running from the Atlantic to the Urals, in which measures for the prevention of surprise attack would be applicable. However, this proposal was later withdrawn on the instruction of the Secretary on the ground that a European zone of inspection against surprise attack should not be made in the context of European security as distinguished from disarmament. This later decision was supported by the Germans. The British wished to keep a proposal for an inspection zone limited to the Rapacki Plan area of united Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia as a fallback position in negotiations with the Soviet Union in the hope that by doing so we would look flexible and might possibly reach a limited agreement which would not be dangerous. Norstad had previously advanced the idea of an inspection zone limited to this area which he believed could be accepted independently of an agreement on reunification.

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### 3. Possibility of Development

The proposals for methods of inspection and control developed in the disarmament negotiations should be applied in the context of German reunification and European security. By establishing a link with other aspects of disarmament the objection against the proposal for an inspection zone in the context of European security instead of the context of disarmament would be met. (It might also be possible to revert to the Norstad Plan although the weight of military opinion seems to be against it. The Germans also have shown themselves strongly opposed to inspection zones which do not include a large part of European Russia. The French Foreign Office shares this view.)

### E. Obligation to React Against Aggression

1. The Western Powers proposed that each party to the Treaty of Assurance "would agree that armed attack in Europe by any party which is also a NATO member against any member which is not a NATO member or vice-versa, would endanger the peace and security which is the object of this treaty and that all the parties would take appropriate action to meet that common danger."

### 2. Discussion

At the time of the Geneva Conference and subsequently this proposal was criticized on the ground that it in effect would force an all-German Government to become a NATO member. This point of view was expressed by the French Ambassador in September 1955 during preliminary discussions of the U.S. plan. He said that the U.S. proposal had the pre-condition that this security arrangement "was to come into effect only if Germans were reunited and joined NATO .... The Three Powers had repeatedly since Berlin committed themselves to a completely free choice of international association (for United Germany) ... The U.S. proposal seemed to deprive Germany of this freedom of choice ... The French saw no risk of Germany going to the East."

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During the preparations for British, French, German, U.S. talks on German reunification and European security in the summer of 1958 the Department originally drafted a provision designed to replace the Geneva proposal on the obligation to react against aggression. This would have made any violation of the zonal limitations provided for in the U.S. proposal a basis for consultation and appropriate counteraction. This proposal was strongly objected to by USSR as offering the German an equivalent of article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty without their having to be members of NATO. It was therefore dropped.

### 3. Possibility of Development

The assurance in case of aggression could be expanded by:

(a) extending it to cover an attack against the Soviet Union by a reunified Germany which was not a NATO member; (The USSR has indicated its belief that a united Germany is dangerous. Khrushchev once told a Frenchman that he had no intention of "adding our Germans to your Germans". The proposed assurance would, theoretically at least, meet the Soviet fear of a reunited Germany more fully than the narrower guarantee proposed at Geneva. It should be recalled, however, that the Soviet Union has said that it considers insulting the implication of such an offer that the USSR needs to depend on a U.S. guarantee against German aggression.)

(b) extending the assurance to cover an attack by an Eastern country against a reunited Germany which was not a NATO member; (Since Germans consider close association with the western defense system an essential to their security it seems unlikely that a reunited Germany would sever its working connections with NATO. However, many West Germans consider a U.S. "guarantee" so essential to their security that an advance U.S. refusal to guarantee a reunited Germany outside of NATO would force them to join NATO. Thus they consider the Geneva formula in effect limits their freedom of choice in international affairs. The assurance suggested above would be valuable in counteracting this widely-held opinion which

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has created doubts in some minds about the ingeniousness of the U.S. position on free choice. Although it seems unlikely that the Senate would authorize such an assurance Senate leaders might be sounded out on the question.)

(c) theoretically we might also give an assurance against any alteration of the frontiers established by a German peace treaty unless approved by all the signatories. (This would meet Soviet fears of a repetition of Munich. However, it is open to the strong objection that it constitutes a recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe in return for German reunification.)

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FOR - Mr. Livingston T. Merchant

TAB A  
December 10, 1958

J. J. Reinstein

German Reunification and European Security

Martin Hillenbrand thought it might be useful if I gave you a note before you left for Paris on recent four-power discussions on these subjects and the rather dreary state of our position.

During the early part of last year, a Four Power Working Group on German reunification in relation to European security was set up by the Three Powers and the Federal Republic. The principal purpose was to show some activity before the German elections. Another motive which the French and Germans had, I believe, was to smoke out American thinking in view of persistent reports which had circulated after the Hungarian crisis that we were thinking of proposing a neutral belt in the center of Europe.

In March 1957, the Working Group drew up a rather elaborate report analyzing the development of the Soviet position since the death of Stalin and commenting on various proposals which had been put forward on Germany and Europe, largely of a disengagement character. The working Group concluded that no basic changes had taken place in the Soviet position. It recommended that the Western position continue to be based on the proposals put forward at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' meeting of 1955. However, it pointed out that there was considerable lack of clarity in certain aspects of the proposals and a widespread public misunderstanding of them. It recommended that steps be taken to clarify the proposals themselves in order to ready them for use when the international situation might make new western proposals appropriate. The Group also recommended that something be done to deal with the problem of our public posture.

While no formal action was taken on the report, it was more or less agreed among the four governments that some public statement should be made before the German elections. The Working Group devoted two further sessions to the drafting of such a statement. The Berlin Declaration of July 1957 was the rather disappointing outcome of this work. It contained little new of substance except an implication that NATO forces would not advance into the East Zone if a reunified Germany joined NATO. The Declaration was cast in a form which the Germans thought would appeal to German opinion but which fell rather flat.

The Working Group assembled again three times in the spring and summer of this year to prepare a position for a possible Summit meeting. For the first time since 1955, this involved a discussion of the substance of the Western position. This discussion revealed a wide area of disagreement

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among the Four Powers and an inability to agree even on the essential elements of the Geneva proposals of 1955.

The first meeting of the Working Group constituted in effect a discussion by the brief writers of the four governments prior to commencement of brief writing. At this meeting, the Germans put forward an interesting view which appeared to reflect thinking at the official level. This was that the Rapacki proposal contained one new element which might be incorporated in the Western position. This was the acceptance of the area of Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia as an area in which controls of an identical character would be acceptable. The Germans considered this an advance over previous Soviet proposals, which were confined to Germany. They suggested that the establishment of controls in such an area would remove the element of discrimination against Germany. Furthermore, the Germans suggested that there was no inconsistency between determining the military status of a reunified Germany prior to reunification and our position that the government of a reunified Germany should have freedom of choice in its political decisions. They said that the key issues on which freedom of choice should operate should be the determination of the German constitutional order, their ability to participate in the political aspects of NATO, and their ability to pursue European integration.

These German views constituted a change from those which the Germans had held during the preparatory discussions for the Geneva Conferences, where they had been unwilling to see controls applied to all Germany, particularly to the Ruhr. (This view was shared by the French). This meant that the proposed European security arrangements would not limit the total size and armament of German forces. Both the Germans and the French again maintained this position in the drafting of the Berlin Declaration.

In the light of these preliminary discussions, the Department prepared an elaboration of the Geneva proposals which we were authorized with the agreement of Defense to put forward as a basis of discussion in the Four Power working Group and the NATO Committee on European Security. These proposals envisaged a European security arrangement involving three zones. An inner zone comprising roughly the present Soviet Zone of Germany and a comparable area of Poland and Czechoslovakia would be subject to measures of quasi-demilitarization with only limited indigenous forces permitted. (This provided automatically for the removal of Soviet forces from the East Zone and adjacent Polish areas).

A second zone, comprising the remainder of Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, would be subject to force and arms limits. We suggested that these limits should fix total forces without regard to nationality. This would have fixed a ceiling on total forces in Western Germany which could either be composed of German forces or mixed German and other NATO forces. The rationale of this proposal was that, for military purposes,

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only the size and armament of permitted forces was important. At the same time the proposal avoided the difficulty of calling for a withdrawal of United States forces. The proposal envisaged the banning of strategic weapons (IRBM's) from the zone, but no ban on nuclear weapons as such.

The American proposal suggested a third zone, running from the Atlantic to the Urals, in which measures for the prevention of surprise attack would be applicable.

The proposal as originally drawn also included a provision, designed to replace Article 8 of the Geneva proposals, which would have made any violation of the zonal limitations a basis for consultation and appropriate counter-action. This proposal was strongly objected to by USSR as offering the Germans an equivalent of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty without their having to be members of NATO. It was therefore never put forward.

While we were busy elaborating these proposals, the Germans were constructing their position. When they finally presented it to Adenauer, he rejected any idea of a European security arrangement divorced from disarmament. He questioned the value of limitations confined to a narrow zone in view of the development of modern weapons and talked vaguely of an arms control plan running from the Atlantic to the Urals. The Chancellor's position was probably motivated in part from his view that emphasis in any negotiations with the Soviets should be placed on disarmament rather than Germany. His public enunciation of this view had already caused some difficulty in the light of positions we had already taken regarding a Summit meeting.

The entire range of questions was reviewed in two further meetings of the Working Group in which it developed that no agreement could be reached on any substantive aspect of a European security proposal. The United States proposal for an inner zone was objected to by the other powers as asking too much of the Soviets in its eastern extension. (The Germans also withdrew their earlier agreement to the concept of a quasi-demilitarized zone completely). Neither the Germans nor the French would agree to the area of Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia as the basic area of force and arms limitation. In fact, the Germans were unwilling to refer to the idea of a zone. Defense withdrew its tentative agreement to a banning of strategic weapons in the zone. On instructions from the Secretary, we were required to withdraw our proposal for a European zone of inspection against surprise attack in the context of European security, as distinguished from disarmament, a position in which we were joined by the Germans.

In mid-July, the Working Group drew up a report to the four governments detailing these disagreements and reporting its inability to make further progress in the absence of some resolution by governments of the

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issues involved. The Working Group stressed the fact that we are not in a position to advance even the Geneva 1955 proposals as an agreed western position. A report was also made to NATO in which the disagreements were glossed over and a fresh restatement was made of opposition to any disengagement proposal, the one point on which the working Group was able to agree.

The only action which has been taken on the report is the dispatch of a note by the United States to the other three governments noting the disagreements and emphasizing the importance of resolving them prior to any further discussions with the Soviets. We did not feel it appropriate to press for solution of the issues last summer in view of the dim prospect at that time for a Summit meeting and of the fact that Adenauer had related his position in part to the uncertainties of the French situation.

This general state of affairs was reported to the Secretary but there has been no opportunity to discuss it with him.

It seems to me that we are in real difficulty on this subject. Our present policy appears to have been destroyed without a substitute having been created to replace it. Furthermore, the basic elements of our policy as it was are not generally regarded as providing a possible solution which could be negotiated with the Soviets.

I was struck by one point during our four power discussions last summer which is not reflected by the positions reported to governments. This was a general skepticism on the part of the military authorities in all four governments regarding a military arrangement confined to Europe. (The military misgivings were overridden by the British and French Foreign Offices on political grounds). I must say that I personally share this skepticism. I doubt whether it is feasible to conceive of any arrangement confined to Europe which would warrant either side in agreeing to any significant change in its present position.

The logical alternative would be to relate a European settlement to some general agreement in the area of disarmament. Up to now, we have been reluctant to advance any idea which makes so much interdependent. In fact, we have been searching for means of dealing with individual aspects of the disarmament problem. Unless and until this is demonstrated to be impossible (apart from a test-suspension, which is not a true disarmament measure), I would doubt whether any new general approach to the European problem of so broad a character would be politically feasible.

I might add, with reference to an exchange of letters we had while you were in Canada, that I have seen no evidence which would lead me to believe that a proposal for mutual troop withdrawals from Germany would be acceptable to our NATO allies. This might conceivably change if the alternative of a war over Berlin were clearly posed and if it seemed possible that alternative deployment areas for a substantial part of the

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visiting forces in Germany could be found on the Continent and the costs of redeployment could be financed.

If we should find ourselves in the need for advancing new proposals for German reunification and European security in the near future, I would suggest that it would be useful to look again at the U.S. proposal for a three-zone arrangement which was made last May. (I do not see how anything much can be done in the field of German reunification although we might encourage the Germans to explore the possibility of looking at guarantees regarding some of social features of the East Zone). I don't think the U.S. proposal would appeal for a second to the Soviets, but it did seem to me to have a certain superficial plausibility which might have some advantages from the viewpoint of Western opinion.

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Tab B

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF  
DISENGAGEMENT FOR GERMANY

A. Withdrawals of Foreign Troops

1. Types of Withdrawal
  - a. Total Troop Withdrawals Based on the Status Quo
  - b. Partial Withdrawals Based on the Status Quo
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2. United Germany Excluded from NATO or Warsaw Pact
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POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF  
DISENGAGEMENT FOR GERMANY

A. Withdrawals of Foreign Troops

1. Types of Withdrawal

a. Total Troop Withdrawals Based on the Status Quo

Total withdrawal of troops from East and West Germany without an agreement on German reunification would create numerous political problems from the point of view of Germany.

(1) The East German population is overwhelmingly anti-Communist and the present GDR government and the SED party which dominates it are kept in power by the presence of massive Soviet troops. The withdrawal of these troops might consequently release political forces in East Germany which would sweep away the Grotewohl government and produce a situation in which a new government or constituent assembly might take events into its own hands and move to reunite with the Federal Republic by direct action. If Soviet troops were sent back into East Germany to restore a Communist-oriented regime - possibly at the invitation of the latter - there would be almost irresistible pressure upon the Government of the Federal Republic to send troops to support the East German independence movement. This might in turn precipitate a third world war. \*

(2) Some Germans have long speculated about the possibility that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany would clear the way for reunification but there seemed until recently to be no disposition on the part of a large number of Germans to advocate such a course. However, last spring there was a significant shift of position on the question of troop withdrawals in opposition circles. The SPD urged the Government to advocate negotiations with the Soviet Union aimed at 'the equivalent withdrawal of foreign troops from an atom-free zone, and the establishment of ceilings for national troops in areas of appropriate size under effective controls' without mention of reunification.

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\* In view of the dangers of this situation the West German Government would probably do its utmost to exert a restraining influence on East Germans under such circumstances and would urge them to follow a course of evolutionary development which would reduce the chance of Soviet re-entry. It is possible that an East German government could steer a conciliatory course which would avoid disaster but it would be extremely difficult.

(3) Withdrawal

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(3) Withdrawal of non-German NATO troops from West Germany without an agreement on reunification would probably be interpreted in the Federal Republic as a proof that the United States was taking less seriously its responsibility for the defense of Germany. All German parties view the presence of U.S. troops on German soil, at least in token numbers, as a guarantee of the U.S. commitment to respond against an attack on German territory. Despite treaty assurances, U.S. troop withdrawals unaccompanied by a compensatory improvement in the political status of Germany would probably result in a wave of discouragement and defeatism in both East and West Germany. Germans would interpret such action as indicating that the United States had abandoned its support of reunification unless adequate safeguards against Soviet re-entry were provided.

(4) Agreements on troop withdrawals involving the recognition of the interzonal border between East and West Germany or including East Germany as a signatory are unacceptable because this would constitute Western recognition of the GDR and of the division of Germany.

Nevertheless in spite of the problems discussed above, if adequate safeguards could be found to prevent Soviet re-entry, there might be great political advantages to total troop withdrawals from East Germany prior to reunification. Since no such safeguards have yet been advanced by authoritative military circles these advantages remain theoretical in character. They are discussed in Enclosure 1 to Tab A.

b. Partial Withdrawals Based on the Status Quo

Limited or staged troop withdrawals based on the division of Germany raise the same political problems as withdrawals based on the continuation of the status quo. Such arrangements would also reduce German confidence in Western support, increase the imbalance between Western and Soviet military capabilities and either confirm the division of Germany (if the withdrawals of Soviet troops were so small as not to impair the capability of the Soviet Union to keep the GDR regime in power) or create the problems discussed in Section 1-a above if Soviet withdrawals were large enough to impair this capability.

c. Withdrawals Based on Reunification

A total withdrawal of troops from East and West Germany linked with a satisfactory agreement on reunification would have important political implications.

(1) An all-German government chosen through free elections and not subject to the military pressure of Soviet troops on German territory would almost certainly be strongly oriented towards the West. All signs indicate that the mass of the population in Eastern Germany is bitterly opposed to the Soviet Union. Without the backing of Soviet troops on

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German soil the chances of Soviet domination and influence in Germany through political or economic channels appear small since it seems reasonable to count on the removal from the key executive positions in the government, the army and the police of the leading East German agents of the USSR. (A satisfactory reunification agreement would have to provide against the retention of such persons in positions of power despite possible Soviet attempts to insist that they be given special status which would give them permanent tenure. Satisfactory provisions in this field, of which of course free elections would be the most foolproof, are essential to any political settlement.)

(2) It is more difficult to predict the effect upon the political balance of power between the German political parties, provided Soviet military pressure is removed as a result of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Although Eastern Germany is the traditional stronghold of the Social Democratic Party, the prestige which the CDU government would gain if it were in power at the time an agreement on reunification was reached might be so great that the party would carry a majority of East German constituencies - at least in the first election. Even if the first all-German Prime Minister were a Socialist the new government would continue to reflect the basic pro-Western orientation of the SPD party and of the country at large and would be unlikely to introduce any basic changes in German foreign policy. German attitudes towards Western European institutions such as the CSC, EURATOM and the Common Market might be modified because the Socialists have always wished to see these institutions expanded to include the Northern European countries. The influence of East German representatives might have a significant influence on government policies towards economic planning and nationalization. A Socialist government might give somewhat less vigorous support to the German army but the party has always been opposed to the demilitarization of West Germany. Though they may have a more unrealistic view of military requirements and are more susceptible to pacifist influence than the CDU, they are keenly aware that a united Germany must have sufficient retaliatory capabilities to make it clear to the Soviets that attack on German territory would be unprofitable.

(3) The withdrawal of Soviet troops if accompanied by an agreement on reunification providing for the formation of an all-German government on the basis of free elections should not create the problem of re-entry inherent in an agreement for the withdrawal of troops based on the continuation of the status quo. The signing of such an agreement by the Soviets would be tantamount to their acceptance in advance of a non-Communist German government. Although there is no indication whatever that the Soviet Union would accept such a solution at the present time, it does provide a safe basis for a western proposal. Soviet acceptance of a procedure which would almost certainly result in the establishment of a Western-oriented government in control of East Germany would imply a decision not to reintroduce troops in the area to reverse this development.

(4) The

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(4) The feasibility of the withdrawal of foreign NATO troops from West Germany depends upon the military balance of power in Europe. NATO withdrawals must take place under conditions which will not open up the West to intolerable threats and dangers from the Soviet Union. Thus agreements in the field of disarmament may be required before Western troop withdrawal would be feasible. For example, an inspection zone to guarantee against surprise attack which included a considerable area in Western Russia would have a direct bearing upon this question. Advance warning of attack would provide extra time to reinforce Germany from outside as well as greatly reduce the chances of a sneak attack. There would be great political advantages to offering to withdraw foreign troops from Germany as part of a general agreement for European settlement providing for German reunification, the reduction of conventional forces and the establishment of an atom-free zone in Central Europe. The proposals for the reduction of conventional weapons and forces to the levels suggested in general terms for the second and third stages of the disarmament plan outlined to the Western Powers at the London disarmament negotiations might provide a basis for negotiating this phase of a general agreement. German Defense Minister Strauss has advocated such an approach.

## B. Arms Limitations

### 1. Types of Limitation

#### a. Exclusion of Strategic Nuclear Weapons

If an effective distinction between tactical and strategic weapons could be made on the basis of range rather than yield strategic weapons might be defined for purposes of this discussion as IRBM missiles with atomic warheads. Although the German Government is awaiting the decision of SACEUR concerning the advisability of placing IRBM's in Germany the Government and the public at large do not expect that SACEUR will wish to station them in Germany. German opinion would approve of this decision because there is a strong feeling that IRBM sites would increase the danger of atomic bombing.

Although the German Government itself has taken the position that it is unwise to limit the stationing of atomic weapons except possibly in the context of a general disarmament agreement, a proposal for barring IRBM's from East and West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, this suggestion would probably be attractive to German opinion if linked with proposals for reunification for several reasons:

(1) They feel there is no strategic advantage in having IRBM's in Germany.

(2) An inspection system might be devised which would not subject Germany to minute Soviet inspection, because IRBM launching sites at least for the present would be very difficult to conceal.

(3) The

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(3) The inclusion of Poland and Czechoslovakia in an inspection system would have the advantage of increasing Western influence in Eastern Europe.

Unless Germany were reunified such proposal would certainly involve problems regarding the recognition of East Germany. The latest suggestion by Rapacki that the East German regime make a unilateral declaration of its intention to exclude nuclear weapons from its territory does not eliminate the problem. The Western Powers' acceptance of the bona fides of this unilateral declaration would amount to a sort of recognition. Furthermore, inspection measures would surely involve some type of dealing with the East German authorities.

b. Exclusion of All Nuclear Weapons

The introduction of nuclear weapons into Federal German territory has been a burning political issue in the Federal Republic. The Social Democratic Party has strongly opposed equipping the German army with atomic weapons and permitting the stationing of such weapons in German territory. It is well known, however, that NATO forces in the Federal Republic are equipped with tactical atomic weapons. The announcement that Redstone missiles were being sent to Germany did not arouse any storm of protest - an indication that this decision is generally accepted as a fait accompli. The Government meanwhile has categorically rejected the Rapacki proposal as a plan "designed to bring about the end of NATO". It has stated that it cannot expect other governments to place troops in Germany unless they are able to equip them with modern weapons and warned that applications of such restrictions would result in the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Furthermore, the Government has gone on record as reserving without restrictions its right to decide whether to equip its own forces with atomic weapons.

If renunciation of nuclear weapons were linked with an agreement on reunification there would probably be substantial majority support in Germany for such a proposal. There is a belief that the USSR is genuinely alarmed at the prospect of being encircled by atomic weapons and that a concession in this field might provide the quid pro quo for reunification for which Germans have been searching. Such a suggestion has been put forward by a leading German publicist, Wilhelm Schutz, editor of Aussenpolitik. Furthermore, many Germans believe that as a result of reunification the strategic position of the West in Europe would be so improved that the West could accept such limitations without worsening their overall position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and that Germany could depend on the deterrent power of Western atomic weapons outside of Germany.

The SPD has urged the Government to declare its readiness to participate in negotiations with the goal of achieving a zone in Europe free of nuclear weapons as a step towards general disarmament without mentioning reunification. Although the SPD has not explicitly severed the connection between agreements

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on European security and reunification, its present emphasis on the need for a reduction of tensions has tended to subordinate the need for progress on reunification to the need for agreement on first steps in the disarmament field, partly as a means of improving the atmosphere for reunification and reducing the danger of atomic war. For example, an SPD spokesman, Fritz Erler, said that it had never been suggested that reunification would be the by-product of the Rapacki Plan. It might be the first serious step for rapprochement which would facilitate discussions on reunification. The Government has attacked the SPD for abandoning the link between European security and reunification.

c. Exclusion of ABC Weapons

The Federal Republic under the Brussels Treaty is forbidden to manufacture ABC weapons. The extension of similar limitations to East Germany and other Eastern European territories would be advantageous to West Germany. The points discussed in the previous sections regarding the stationing of such weapons in Germany apply here as well.

d. Limitations on Delivery Systems

Since the only practical method of drawing a clear distinction between strategic and tactical atomic weapons is to define strategic weapons as being above a given range, any plan for the limitations of strategic atomic weapons amounts in practice to limitations on delivery systems. For a discussion of these problems see above.

The Germans consider anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles essential to their defense and are therefore unlikely to accept any limitation on shorter range missiles except as part of a general disarmament agreement.

e. Limitations on Conventional Forces

The Federal Republic has accepted the principle of arms limitations as a means of limiting national military strength in the Brussels Treaty. The Western Powers at Geneva proposed the extension of this system of control as a basis for enforcing agreements on arms limitations and force levels. The Germans would not consider such limitations except in connection with reunification.

Germans are keenly aware of the implausibility of asking the Russians to withdraw from East Germany if NATO forces then move in to take their place. German planners have therefore considered the possibility of demilitarizing the area. The German plans, together with a parallel British proposal presented in the summer of 1955, were considered by the Four Western Foreign Ministers but not accepted.

In 1957

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In 1957 the Four Powers in the Berlin Declaration assured the Soviet Union that they would not take military advantage of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany. The language did not specifically offer a demilitarized zone.

Such a zone, completely stripped of armed forces of any kind, would create political problems for the new German state. Under such an arrangement the capital of united Germany would be included and if applied in the most literal sense the central government would find itself without the forces needed to protect itself against a ~~push~~ or to preserve civil order. Any plan for the "demilitarization" of East Germany should therefore provide for only partial demilitarization. The central German government must have at its disposal the security police forces needed to protect the capital and to preserve order, as well as border guards to protect the frontier. However, a special area with strictly limited ceilings on German troops and armaments and subject to inspection should give sufficient guarantees against the West acquiring any military advantage from the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Particularly in view of the public statements of the German Government on this subject and the assurance given in the Berlin declaration it is important to prepare specific indications of the type of limitation we are prepared to offer in this respect.

## 2. Zones of Limitation

### a. East Germany

As noted in the previous section the special problem created by East Germany - especially in the minds of Germans not only of the opposition but also of members of the Government - (for example, the point of view expressed by Dr. Grewe during discussions in 1957 between representatives of the Four-Power Working Group) - indicated the need to give special consideration to the status of East Germany. The Geneva proposals laid down as a basic condition for any zone applying west of the eastern border of United Germany that it must be balanced by a zone similar in size and character eastward of the frontier. This principle would have required the demilitarization of large areas of Poland and Czechoslovakia if East Germany were demilitarized. Although from the German viewpoint this would be advantageous if attainable, the majority would probably consider it unreasonable to insist upon such an Eastern concession. They view the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the advance of a West-oriented German authority several hundred miles eastward as a substantial gain in itself for the West. Furthermore, the majority of Germans believe that a proposal for demilitarization of East Germany would represent a unilateral concession on the part of the USSR which it would be unreasonable to expect except as a part of a larger settlement involving Western concessions as well.

### b. Zones

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b. Zones of Comparable Size

Many Germans would probably agree to the withdrawal of foreign troops from West Germany to counterbalance Soviet withdrawals from East Germany if NATO troops withdrawn were replaced by adequate national forces (see below). In general, however, they would wish to see limitations applying to reunified German soil also applying in as much as depth as possible eastward. They would therefore be opposed to using as the central line in any plan for general arms limitations any line further west than the eastern frontier of the reunified Germany. In this respect the Rapacki Plan proposal of including Poland and Czechoslovakia provides a useful precedent.

c. Limitations of National Forces

1. In East and West Germany

There is no readiness on the part of the Federal Government to consider any limitations of national forces except in connection with an agreement on reunification. The German position during the disarmament discussions in NATO in 1957 was that the only acceptable type of agreement affecting European territory to be based on the division of Germany was one for an inspection zone to guard against surprise attack. In publicizing German approval of a first-stage disarmament agreement independent of an agreement on reunification Chancellor Adenauer emphasized that the European phase of the agreement was, strictly speaking, not disarmament at all because an inspection system to guard against surprise attack has no direct relation to levels of forces.

2. In a Reunified Germany

If the Germans agree to the withdrawal of all foreign troops in return for reunification they will wish as part of the settlement to be assured of their own security. This sense of security will presumably rest upon being satisfied on three counts: (1) that other Western countries will come to the defense of Germany if attacked (discussed below under F); (2) that sufficient national forces are available to maintain internal order, protect the country against localized attack and hold off a major attack until the West can come to their defense; and (3) that the retaliatory capability of the West is sufficient.

The German reactions to recent weapons developments will have a great influence on their estimate of the needs in each of these fields.

Although the Socialists would be more likely than the present government to put a high value on a treaty guarantee of German territory by the United States if U.S. troops are withdrawn both government and opposition are keenly aware of the necessity for adequate defensive capabilities

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if Germany is to survive as an independent country. Their estimates would vary in degree rather than in kind. Although the Socialists would probably consider a smaller number of troops to be required they would not question the need for forces in considerable numbers. If the German army is to be equipped with atomic weapons capable of making any attack on German soil costly and of holding off a German defeat long enough for the United States and the other NATO countries to rally to their defense, the Germans would probably agree to reductions in force levels below those set in present NATO planning. If atomic weapons were barred from German soil the requirements for conventional forces would be thought to be considerably higher.

Full German confidence in the effectiveness of their defense forces is of crucial importance for the maintenance of German political independence, self-confidence and ability to resist Soviet pressures if non-German NATO forces are withdrawn.

### 3. In Zones of Comparable Size

#### a. On Both Sides of the Present Dividing Line Between East and West Germany

The Germans would be willing to apply special limitations to East Germany which would in no way be acceptable in the territory of the Federal Republic.

#### b. On Both Sides of the Eastern Frontier of Reunified Germany

Application of ceilings acceptable for the Federal Republic to similar areas eastward would of course be politically advantageous. Except as part of a general disarmament system, however, authorized force levels for the area covering West Germany would have to be sizeable to be acceptable to the Germans - probably as high, if not higher than, the forces of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Last summer the Germans indicated their unwillingness to discuss plans for any zone of limitations applying only to Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia at a time when there were no prospects of serious discussions, when the disarmament picture was not clear and when new weapons were being developed rapidly.

### D. Alliance Systems

#### 1. United Germany Free to Join NATO

The German Government has strongly supported the Western position at Geneva that the United Germany should have full freedom of choice in international affairs. This position is questioned by the opposition representing about 40 per cent of the electorate - the SPD and FDP. Both parties argue that the Soviet Union will never accept an arrangement which adds to

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NATO the strength of Eastern Germany and that no serious attempt will be made to negotiate upon reunification until the West offers to renounce Germany's membership in NATO.

The political advantages to Germany's remaining in NATO are strong. Under optimum conditions for the development of an integrated Western European community Germany, the strongest nation in Western Europe, would be a full member. If Germany does not share in military decisions and assume joint responsibilities and obligations, including financial burdens of defense, she will stand in a special relationship to other European countries and will not be in a position to play a leading role in all phases of European development. Even though she continues to remain a member of the CSC, the Common Market and EURATOM, the interrelation of military and political problems is so close that she will be in a special position and her interests will be likely to run in a different direction from the general interests of the community. Furthermore, even though she remains as a political but not military member of NATO - a status which would certainly be highly suspect in the eyes of the USSR and would be out of place in an organization which is essentially a military one - her voice and her influence would be greatly reduced. The loss of Germany as a central force in European organizations would surely weaken the European cooperative movement.

The countervailing political consideration is the effect in the long run of failing to make a gesture for reunification which would seem in German eyes to be a sincere offer meeting what a substantial minority, possibly a majority, in Germany believes has been a legitimate reason for the Soviet Union to reject previous Western offers. The West is being constantly criticized for insisting on terms for reunification which amount in effect to a demand for unconditional surrender.

If Germans question the sincerity of Western support for reunification serious disagreement and mistrust between Germany and the other Western Powers may result. The yearning for genuine attempts at settling outstanding problems, strong in all countries, is rendered particularly strong because of the special German concern for East Germany.

## 2. United Germany Excluded from NATO or Warsaw Pact

The question whether German membership in NATO as a full military partner is necessary for the defense of Europe is primarily a military one. But in giving an answer political considerations as well as the implications of new weapons for the defense mission of the United States and NATO forces must be taken into account. Two questions in particular come to mind:

(1) Will the advantages of reunifying Germany, removing a powder keg in Europe and withdrawing Soviet influence eastward outweigh the disadvantage of having a German defense force outside of NATO?

(2) If NATO

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(2) If NATO strategy is to deter Soviet attack through threat of nuclear retaliation and to deal with localized attack on the spot can this be done adequately by German national forces backed by NATO retaliatory power?

It is noteworthy that the leading French Foreign Office expert on security and reunification problems was thinking as early as last summer of proposing a plan by which Germany would be guaranteed by the other NATO powers in event of an attack but would not extend on its part a similar assurance to other NATO powers if attacked. Does not this proposal imply that he was thinking of a status for Germany outside of NATO?

In view of the intense German hatred of Russia, particularly among Germans in the Soviet Zone, there seems to be little doubt that the reunited country would be strongly pro-Western and would continue to cooperate in other Western enterprises even if she were not in NATO. Although this participation would not be as close or complete as envisaged in Paragraph D 1, this disadvantage would have to be weighed against the advantage of having found a solution of a major European problem. If the proposal is rejected - which seems most likely - the demonstration of a new determination to work out problems may have a long-run influence upon groups in the Kremlin favoring a more moderate course and may demonstrate to Eastern Europe a serious interest in their problems on the part of the West which may have an important influence on their attitude and morale by holding out to them the prospect of a feasible status towards which to work.

In the last analysis the decision whether unified Germany should be in NATO will be made by the German government. The question should be openly and thoroughly discussed with the pros and cons carefully considered. The German Government should consider this possibility without feeling that she was destroying the confidence of other NATO powers in her reliability and in the knowledge that in so doing she would not renounce all her protective ties with the West. If the German government should decide this was an offer worth making methods could be worked out by which it could be made binding upon an all-German government without being a status imposed upon the German people. A possible method would be to make an agreement to withdraw foreign troops from unified Germany dependent upon a decision of the new German constituent assembly elected through free all-German elections to remain outside NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

In such an event united Germany could continue other non-military ties with the West as well as similar ties with Eastern European countries. The pattern of German trade is directed strongly westward and although there are some possibilities of expansion eastward it would seem that the pull of economic interests would still be predominantly westward with the result that economic interests would reinforce political inclinations. While Germany would certainly occupy a more central position than at the present time and would take an even stronger interest in Central European politics

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than at present, her general pro-Western orientation would continue. So long as Germany remains a democratic country the incompatibility between her way of life and government and that of the Soviet Union would stand in the way of the development of close associations with the USSR. An estimate whether NATO itself could survive the withdrawal of the Federal Republic would of course also have to be made.

### 3. Abolition of NATO and Warsaw Pact

It has been a major objective of Soviet policy to bring about the dissolution of NATO and Moscow has been willing to propose the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in return and the erection of a European security organization in its place. Since the Warsaw Pact countries are closely linked to the Soviet Union through bilateral agreements, political and party controls and close economic ties, the elimination of the Warsaw Pact would be essentially a pro forma gesture. The Western Powers agree that NATO itself is not negotiable.

### E. Assurances Against Aggression

#### 1. Assurances in Case of Armed Attack in Europe by a NATO Member Against a Non-NATO Member or Vice Versa

The assurances put forward in the Draft Outline of a Treaty of Assurance tabled at Geneva in October 1955 have been criticized as in fact depriving the free all-German government of freedom of action in international affairs. For example, the French Ambassador in Washington in September 1955, expressed the opinion that a security guarantee which came "into effect only if the Germans were reunited and joined NATO - seemed to deprive Germany of the completely free choice of international association" for united Germany to which the Three Powers had repeatedly committed themselves since Berlin.

Many Germans share this view. They consider a U.S. "guarantee" so essential to their security that an advance U.S. refusal to guarantee Germany outside of NATO would force them to join NATO. The extension of the Geneva assurance to cover an attack against a reunified Germany whether a NATO member or not would eliminate a major cause of German dissatisfaction with the Geneva proposals.

Likewise assurance to the Soviet Union against attack by unified Germany whether a NATO member or not would seem theoretically at least to meet the Soviet fear of a reunified Germany more fully than the narrower "guarantee" proposed at Geneva. (The Soviet Union of course has implied that it considers a Western offer of a guarantee ridiculous if not insulting.)

Proposals

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Proposals have been made in the past of a Locarno-type guarantee of the territorial integrity of European countries. This proposal is objectionable because it implies recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe which the United States is unwilling to agree to. Therefore, the types of assurance discussed in preceding paragraphs are preferable to a Locarno-type guarantee.

Types of assurances might vary. Although it would be possible to issue a unilateral U.S. assurance it seems more likely that any assurance would be a multilateral assurance involving the signatories on any agreement on European security.

#### F. Political Conditions

##### 1. Continuation of the Status Quo

German Socialists are putting increased emphasis on reaching agreements with the Soviets which would reduce the dangers of a nuclear arms race without insisting, as they did in the past, that disarmament and security must be linked with reunification. Many German intellectuals share these views but the Government maintains strongly that any agreement on European security would be unacceptable if based on the division of Germany. Embassy Bonn considers that the mass of the population is opposed to experiments, and supports Government policy on this point. There are increasing indications that CDU leaders think that a more far-reaching reunification policy is required to counter the rising mood of discontent with the Government program which is developing among newspaper editors, writers, teachers and other German intellectuals - moods which are being exploited by the FDP and SPD - but they are insisting that the link between reunification and security must be maintained.

##### 2. German Reunification Through Free Elections

Reunification through free elections is the essential feature in the Western reunification plan. Arrangements which would continue in power the Communist regime in East Germany against popular will would be dangerous and unacceptable. Concessions in this direction would undermine the simple, clear and impressive position of the West on free election which is easily understood throughout the world. There are, however, possibilities for altering some of the provisions of the previous Western position. For example, free elections in East Germany under international supervision might prepare the way for discussions between East and West German representatives on future steps for reunification. (This suggestion has been made by Bundestag President Eugen Gerstenmaier.)

##### 3. German Reunification Through Confederation

The Soviet and East German proposals for confederation are not popular in West Germany. They are recognized as tricks to preserve the hated East German regime in power on a parity with the Federal Republic.

Concessions

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Concessions along these lines are unwise. They would compromise the simple and forceful Western position on free elections.

Various suggestions of dealing with East German representatives could perhaps be dealt with most effectively by replying that the West or the West Germans would be willing to deal with any East German regime which is chosen through free elections.

There are some features of the present East German social system which might be acceptable to the East Germans. The question of preserving such features could be also discussed by East and West Germans after free elections were held in East Germany. Discussions of such proposals independently of free elections, however, are damaging because they tend to erode away support for the basic principle of free elections, and would add to the stature of the GDR.

#### 4. Increased Independence in the Satellites

Although West Germans strongly favor :  
satellites they would be bitterly opposed to making  
reunification conditional upon what they would view :  
for Eastern Europe such as insisting on free elections.

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ENCLOSURE 1 TO TAB R

WITHDRAWALS OF TROOPS PRIOR TO  
REUNIFICATION

Without Soviet ground troops it might be impossible to keep a Soviet puppet regime in power in East Germany. This being the case it seems very doubtful that the Soviet Union would be willing to withdraw its troops except on the basis of additional conditions which would be totally unacceptable to Western opinion in general and German opinion in particular. It seems improbable that they would contemplate, in return for Western withdrawals from Germany, withdrawing their troops with the express intention of sending them back in to stamp out any anti-Communist developments which they must know would be likely to occur. In view of the explosive natures of such a situation they would be foolhardy to take such a risk unless they were convinced that the West would fail to respond.

(1) A Western offer to discuss withdrawals would therefore almost certainly reveal the fact that the USSR required additional conditions which would eliminate any chance that the U.S. would come to the defense of Europe and would perpetuate Soviet control of Germany. They would be likely therefore to insist (a) on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe, the elimination of all foreign bases and the banning of nuclear weapons and (b) on a peace treaty for Germany which would limit German national forces to a negligible size, provide for close Soviet supervision and inspection, perpetuate Soviet institutions in east Germany and establish methods of enforcing the observance of the treaty by Soviet and other troops (in other words, legalize Soviet intervention).

(2) This being the case there might be great psychological advantages to smoking the Soviet Union out on this issue if we could eliminate the danger of Soviet re-entry. The most effective way of focusing attention on Soviet pre-conditions for troop withdrawals would be to agree to total troop withdrawals on the basis of an agreement that East and West Germany would work out reunification after all Soviet troops were out of East Germany. Such an offer would seem to be dangerous - in view of the political sentiments of the East German population - only if East Germany remained subject to Soviet military pressure.

(3) In this context the problem of Soviet re-entry is a critical question. Careful consideration should be given to the possibilities of an inspection system as a guarantee against re-entry. If an agreement on the withdrawal of troops provided that zones of considerable depth on the Eastern and Western frontiers of Germany were subject to constant inspection re-entry could not take place without advance warning. If re-entry were clearly recognized as a casus belli and if the Soviet Union took Western guarantees seriously such an inspection system might provide a very strong deterrent against re-entry.

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ENCLOSURE 1 TO TAB B

(4) In the last analysis the feasibility of such guarantees would rest upon the judgement of military experts as to whether it would be possible to extend them if U.S. and British forces were not stationed in Germany. Their effectiveness would depend upon the degree of credence given to them by the Soviet Union and the degree of confidence which the German people derived from them.

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TAB C

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

April 11, 1958

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In your letter to the Secretary of Defense dated 11 February 1958 you requested the views of the Department of Defense regarding the military aspects of a European security arrangement under certain contingencies. This matter was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration. Their views, with which the Department of Defense is in general agreement, are inclosed herewith.

The Department of Defense considers that the United States should adhere to the position that a European security arrangement must be directly related to the reunification of Germany. The Soviet proposals in both the broader field of disarmament and the more limited area of European security appear to have one characteristic in common -- the fairly obvious purpose of weakening the military capability and the political solidarity of the NATO Alliance. Their proposals for the reduction in force levels in the NATO-Warsaw Pact areas, the thinning out of foreign forces in Germany, and the establishment of a nuclear-free zone, represent varying approaches toward the same objective. An assessment of the implications of any of these proposals or variants thereof should, therefore, be related to their impact on the NATO military posture.

In their report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff point out that the present Shield forces are, at best, submarginal. Any thinning out or withdrawing of United States and Allied Forces, or the establishment of a nuclear-free zone, under the conditions of a divided Germany, would therefore be in the direction of a less-than-adequate military structure or facade, in the face of the unresolved political problems which justified the buildup of these forces initially. The Department of Defense concurs in the viewpoint of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that such proposals carry an unacceptable military risk.

With regard to a security arrangement under the conditions of a reunified Germany, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have presented certain military factors which bear upon this problem. These are summarized in the Conclusions of the final page of their report. With one exception, the Department of Defense considers the military conditions specified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

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as the price of a reunified Germany, to be entirely valid. Although it shares the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United States should explore with our NATO Allies all aspects of the redeployment of the allied forces which might be withdrawn from Germany, the Department of Defense believes that the relocation of any substantial number of United States forces in areas contiguous to Germany, such as France or the Lowlands, would be attended by obstacles -- political and financial as well as military -- of an order as to render such relocation a highly doubtful alternative to the withdrawal of these forces from the Continent. In any event, this would seem to accentuate the necessity of assuring a united Germany the right to raise and maintain forces adequate for her defense requirements.

Judging by their attitude to date, it appears unlikely that the Soviets would, at this time, accede or give serious consideration to proposals for a reunified Germany. The Department of Defense recognizes, however, that regardless of whether Soviet agreement would be forthcoming a requirement still exists for the formulation of a security arrangement, in the context of a reunified Germany, which could be proposed by the United States and our Allies at a Summit meeting. The report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addressed to the subject in the abstract, provides certain general military guidelines. The Department of Defense is prepared to review further this matter with you in the context of over-all United States strategy and objectives as developed for a Summit meeting or to furnish further military advice on specific proposals.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Neil McElroy

Inclosure  
a/s

The Honorable John Foster Dulles

The Secretary of State

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: European Security and German Reunification (U).

1. The following views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are submitted in response to a letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), subject, "Preparation for a High Level Meeting with the Soviet Union", dated 21 February 1958, enclosing a letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense in which he requested military views on specific proposals in the linked fields of European Security and German reunification for use in possible high level meetings with the Soviet Union.

2. After careful analysis and consideration of the request of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), that comments and recommendations be submitted under each of the situations and assumptions listed in the chart attached to his memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff determined that they could best provide the military guidance desired by the Secretary of State and the detailed information requested by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), by addressing their comments to the basic positions developed in the following paragraphs:

I. GENERAL

3. A review of "the linked fields of European Security and German reunification" logically starts with an examination of the provisions of NSC 5524/1, subject: "Basic U.S. Policy in Relation to Four-Power Negotiations", dated 11 July 1955, and the subsequent proceedings of the quadripartite Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers conferences of 1955, at Geneva (including the tripartite and West German consultations prior thereto). In this connection, notice is taken of the views of the President publicly expressed to Premier Bulganin on 7 March 1958, Section V, Paragraphs (1), (2) and (3).

4. As recently as April 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the provisions of NSC 5524/1 and concluded that the position set forth on neutralized areas, demilitarized zones, arms limitations, and withdrawal of forces contains appropriate guidance if the United States is drawn into negotiations in the immediate future. The review of the military aspects of this policy now being undertaken, is therefore directed primarily toward the determination of any new factors which would be of major significance in modifying positions previously adopted.

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5. The deployment of U.S. forces alongside our allies in Central Europe is our contribution to the NATO Shield Forces. These forces, together with allied nuclear retaliatory power, constitute the over-all NATO deterrent against Soviet aggression in the area. The Shield force, to be effective, must possess a sufficient relative combat capability to leave no doubt, either in the European or Soviet mind, that any "smash and grab" attempt by the USSR against Central Europe would result in a conflict of such magnitude as to bring about all-out war. Presently, with the British forces thinning out, the France's inadequate contribution, due to her operations in North Africa, the Shield forces in place are, at best, submarginal. Consequently, any tampering with the present tenuous allied deployments in Germany, such as total or partial withdrawal, establishment of demilitarized zones, or limitations on forces and armaments would require major concessions on the part of the Soviets to compensate for the military risk involved in such adjustments.

6. U.S. policy toward Germany, recently affirmed on 7 February 1958, sets forth "Continue to press for reunification of Germany through free all-German elections . . . that the reunification of Germany is essential to any genuine relaxation of tensions between the Soviet Union and the West, but that the United States will not agree to any reunification involving . . . (c) the withdrawal of United States and other allied forces from West Germany without an effective military quid pro quo from the Soviets and the Satellites...." It is within the frame of reference of this national policy and especially the requirement of "an effective military quid pro quo from the Soviets and the Satellites," that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the issues involved in arriving at acceptable military arrangements for a disengagement in Central Europe. There are many combinations and various forms under which a disengagement or withdrawal of foreign forces in Germany could take place. Regardless of what form these may take, the military significance will be gauged by the relative combat power of the residual contending forces.

II. LIMITATIONS OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE  
UNDER CONDITIONS OF A REUNIFIED GERMANY

A. GERMANY REMAINING IN NATO

7. The critical problem for the United States, in the event of significant U.S. withdrawals from Germany, would be the effect of such action on (a) the credibility of the deterrent in both Allied and Soviet eyes, and (b) the evaluation by our allies of the extent to which they consider the United States will honor its commitment to defend the European NATO area in the face of Soviet attack. If such a withdrawal would result in a major deployment off the continent, European loss of confidence in our solemn pledge to defend NATO would most likely result in its dissolution, regardless of any Soviet matching move. This situation is unacceptable but could be mitigated by a relocation of the allied forces in Germany to France and the Low Countries. The cost and

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the political problems which would arise from such a redeployment might prove insurmountable. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while fully cognizant that the practicalities surrounding a withdrawal from Western Germany might eventually leave no alternative to a withdrawal from the continent, nevertheless feel that the United States should not forego the possibility of retaining forces in Europe, perhaps in reduced strength, without a full examination of all aspects of this problem with our NATO Allies.

8. A proposal requiring a withdrawal of Soviet forces might be made more persuasive if the withdrawal were not required to extend beyond East Germany. Furthermore, there is a possibility that the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Germany could well have other major repercussions in Eastern Europe. It might give powerful encouragement to those elements in satellite countries seeking greater autonomy from the USSR. It is recognized that the lesson of the East German revolt in 1953 and the Hungarian uprising of 1956 indicates very strongly that Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe depends primarily on the Soviet will and ability to use force to preserve their control. Nevertheless, despite the uncertainties, such an Allied proposal could, if accepted, result in a series of events which might eventually force the Soviet forces to withdraw to the USSR.

9. The withdrawal of the Soviet forces several hundred miles to their own frontiers would have certain adverse effects on the Soviets strategically. A rapid Soviet invasion of Western Europe would be much more difficult, and surprise, in such a move on the ground, impossible to attain. Removal of their lines of communication through the Satellites would necessitate their re-establishment in event of attack. On the other hand, an allied withdrawal from Germany to contiguous areas would involve the risk inherent in a maldeployment, and the additional disadvantages involved in a retreat from our forward strategy, a weakening of NATO, and a de-emphasis on collective security arrangements in general. Balancing those security losses against the advantages accruing from a USSR withdrawal to its own border results in a net military disadvantage to the West. Under conditions of such a withdrawal, additional quid pro quo, such as a compensatory German military build-up beyond their present NATO force goal would be required to make such an arrangement acceptable militarily.

B. GERMANY WITHDRAWING FROM NATO

10. A situation in which a reunified Germany would not be allied with NATO but would remain oriented to the West would bring an additional U.S. risk to the disengagement proposal discussed above. The United States is and must remain committed to collective security as the best defense against militant communism. Recognizing the present trends in West Germany, it is uncertain that West Germany, relieved of formal force commitments to NATO and deprived of the presence of Allied forces, would then undertake a stepped-up rearmament program. A trend toward neutralism and appeasement might well take place. Conversely, clandestine joint planning with NATO, and a resurgence of German military power under the impulse of new found nationalism is also a possibility. As stated in the preceding

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paragraph, it would still remain a U.S. objective to achieve a compensatory German military build-up beyond their present NATO force goals. Regardless of the pros and cons of this issue, the United States is committed before the world to accepting a reunified Germany under terms permitting her, as a sovereign state, to choose her own alliances. From a military point of view, a disarmed reunified Germany would increase the security risk faced by NATO. On the other hand, a rearmed reunified Germany not in NATO but oriented toward the West, would provide certain gains to NATO and a stabilizing influence in Central Europe.

III. THINNING OUT OR WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE UNDER CONDITIONS OF A DIVIDED GERMANY

11. The withdrawal of all Soviet forces to the borders of the Soviet Union, under some conditions, would present a situation favorable to the U.S. and the West, i.e., such as reducing Soviet influence in the satellite areas. It is deemed unlikely, however, that the USSR would agree to such action without, as minimum quid pro quo, the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Germany, and some U.S. accommodation to the German problem, such as possible recognition of East Germany or limitation on West German armaments, or both. It must also be recognized that withdrawal of U.S. forces from Germany would tend to further complicate support of U.S. interests in the extremely precarious and unsound arrangements which even now govern the status of Berlin. The acceptance of such conditions would not only limit to an unacceptable degree the military effectiveness of NATO, but would, in addition, leave such a power vacuum in Western Europe as to permit its domination by Soviet political and military pressure.

12. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not consider that there can be any lasting security in Europe as long as Germany remains divided. They consider that the grave political disadvantages to the free world of disengagement without settlement of political questions extends to the military field as well. In arriving at a military estimate as to what would be the net advantage or disadvantage of various military accommodations being proposed for Central Europe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have viewed any measure of disengagement or limited disarmament in the light of its influence on maintaining an acceptable defense of Western Europe. Such a defense can only be secured by successfully deterring Soviet aggression. Any measure which indicates a willingness to abandon or abruptly modify agreed NATO objectives could only be construed as evidence of weakness. The situation is then one which could be exploited to Soviet advantage and hence to our disadvantage. On balance, therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff regard Communist suggestions on disengagement or thinning out as devices either to avoid the central issue of reunifying Germany by perpetuating its division or to weaken the military strength of the NATO. The net result of any combination of the offers made so far is the reduction of the Western military position.

IV. ESTABLISHMENT

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#### IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ATOM-FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE

13. By memorandum, dated 12 March 1958, you were advised of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Polish Foreign Minister's proposal for the creation of a denuclearized zone in Europe. Further appraisal of arms and forces limitations in Central Europe brings up the proposal of thinning out or limitations in specified areas or regions. Our experience with truce teams and inspection arrangements for demilitarized zones to date teaches that we must be skeptical of even the most foolproof agreements. Any arrangement whatsoever in the disarmament field with the Soviets must be adequately safeguarded by effective inspection and control systems. The control of a cutback in selected forces or the percentage reduction of armaments in specified areas requires a cumbersome and complicated inspection system. Knowing the Soviets rigid reluctance to agree to more than a token inspection system, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a regional restriction of arms involves more risks than a clear-cut relocation or redeployment arrangement. In the final analysis any country whose national survival is threatened by adherence to such restricting agreements will be forced to repudiate them. This means that in areas of opposing military forces, or where a substantial threat exists for Soviet-Bloc military aggression, the agreement for non-employment of nuclear weapons is unenforceable.

14. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned that mounting public and minority political pressures in Europe to restrict the concept of a defense of the NATO area utilizing atomic weapons may undermine the solidarity of the West in any Summit Meeting designed to deal with major issues of disarmament. In their opinion, during preparatory conferences with our Allies, great stress should be laid on clearly recognizing that acceptance of limited agreements for "atom-free" zones is a dangerous concession leading only to increased Soviet military domination.

#### V. SUMMARY


15. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that reunification of Germany in freedom is an essential prerequisite to any other measures that might be taken in the interest of European Security.

16. As in the past, measures proposed by the Soviet Bloc in nearly all cases continue to be directed toward the setting up of divisive forces for disruption of Western unity and the dissolution of the NATO Alliance, thus placing the Soviets in a dominant position in Europe. One of the most important counters to this is continued deployment of U.S. military forces in the NATO forward area.

17. Provided Germany was reunified upon acceptable terms and remained in NATO there would be a net gain to the NATO Alliance.

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18. The reunification of Germany under conditions of an arms limitation and out of NATO would pose an additional military risk, the degree of which would depend on the scope of the arms limitation and Germany's orientation, i.e., Eastward or Westward. Without some meaningful estimate of these factors, the increased degree of risk to NATO security, beyond that assumed by previous commitment, is impracticable to evaluate.

19. From the military point of view, disengagement or withdrawal from a divided Germany poses an unacceptable military risk to the NATO Alliance.

20. Acceptance of limited agreements for "atom-free" zones is a dangerous concession leading only to increased Soviet military domination.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

21. From a military point of view, keeping in mind that the maintenance of an acceptable Allied military defense posture is mandatory, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:

a. The U.S. can accept, as the price of a reunified Germany, in or out of NATO, the withdrawal of all foreign forces from a United Germany provided:

(1) Allied forces in Germany can be relocated in areas contiguous to Germany.

(2) USSR forces from Germany will be positioned behind Soviet borders.

(3) A compensatory build-up is permitted a United Germany.

(4) Adequate safeguards are agreed to in order to verify the withdrawals and prevent evasion.


b. Withdrawals or disengagements of military forces from a divided Germany or the establishment of atom-free zones in Central Europe pose unacceptable military risks.

VII. RECOMMENDATION

22. It is recommended that the above form the basis of your reply to the Secretary of State in this matter.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N. F. TWINING  
Chairman,  
Joint Chiefs of Staff



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